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   Hume is famous for having said that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. But this leads to a 
puzzle. If you cannot get 'ought' from 'is' then where does the 'ought' come from? To say that it is 
societally conditioned doesn't resolve the dilemma. Society might condition the particular things 
ought is applied to, but the concept of 'ought' itself must be already present, already meaningful, 
in order for it to be applied to anything at all. Whence comes this concept? If it can't be derived 
from what is, where can it be derived from?  
   Perhaps we can gain some insight by asking why 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is'. This has to 
do with the presumed value-neutral quality of the 'is'. It is impossible to come to the conclusion 
that something has value from facts which are all value-neutral, for the simple reason that one 
cannot validly introduce into the conclusion of an argument anything that was not already 
implicit in the premises. If you do not begin with a value statement you cannot conclude with 
one. If all that exist are value-neutral facts, then it is impossible to arrive at a value-laden 
imperative. 
    Kant attempted to derive the categorical imperative – that one ought always to behave toward 
others in such a manner that the maxim of one's action can be made a universal law – from our 
rational nature. But why 'ought' one always to behave rationally – especially if one can show that 
to behave 'irrationally' in a particular circumstance can gain one an advantage? Kant here has the 
same problem that Hume noted. He would need to show the value of rationality itself in order to 
support his claim. But if he defended the value of rationality on any other grounds than itself, say 
on utilitarian grounds, his entire ethic would be subverted. He must say that rationality, as such, 
is intrinsically valuable in itself, regardless of its utility for procuring other goods. But how can a 
claim to intrinsic value be supported? It cannot be supported by argumentation, for this would 
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entail subordinating it to another value from which it might be derived – but then it would not be 
intrinsic. Intrinsic value can only be pointed to. 
   This leads us to phenomenology. Phenomenology is that discipline which proceeds through 
'just looking', and then working out the implications of what is seen. The 'just' in the phrase 'just 
looking' is not to be dismissed, for it is critical. In phenomenological investigation one endeavors 
to 'just look' without making any presuppositions, even those concerning the independent 
existence of what is looked at. Through such presupposiontionless looking one endeavors to 
reduce one's experience of the world to just what appears – the basis upon which all that we 
subsequently suppose about the world must be founded. Thus, through phenomenological 
investigation one aims to experience the evidentiary ground of all knowledge.  
    Can we find a legitimate basis for ethical imperatives through just looking at the phenomena 
that appear to us? That is the question of this essay. As ethical imperatives pertain to our relation 
to others, the first thing we will need to consider is how others themselves are revealed to us. To 
do this we will consider Husserl's treatment of the constitution of the other as presented in his 
fifth Cartesian Meditation. Then we will ask whether we can find a ground for ethical life on the 
basis of how the other is manifest. 
 
Solus Ipse 
    Husserl begins by noting that some may think the phenomenological reduction will lead 
inevitably to what he calls a 'transcendental solipsism' (CM 88). Through the phenomenological 
reduction we restrict ourselves to a consideration of only those phenomena that appear. But the 
subjectivity of others, by the very fact of their otherness, does not and cannot appear. 
"Transcendental reduction," writes Husserl, "restricts me to the stream of my pure conscious 
processes and the unities constituted by their actualities and potentialities. And it seems obvious 
that such unities are inseparable from my ego and therefore belong to his concreteness itself" 
(CM 88).  
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     If these unities are inseparable from my ego, then how can I become aware of a ‘unity’ (the 
subjectivity of the other) that is distinct from my ego? The other’s subjectivity is also a 'stream of 
pure conscious processes' which, if they were to appear to me as such, would be, insofar as they 
appear to me, indistinguishable from my conscious processes. In other words, I cannot have 
immediate knowledge of the other's subjectivity, as I do my own, without being that subjectivity, 
as I am my own. But in that case the other would cease to be other. We would meld into one.  
   It follows that the other qua other cannot be known to me in any immediate way. The other's 
subjectivity, as such, can never be a phenomenon for me. This leads to a problem for 
phenomenology itself. The claim of Husserlian phenomenology is that the entire edifice of what 
we legitimately believe can ultimately be explained through reference to what is immediately 
given. This claim is necessary if phenomenology is to serve as the primordial foundation of 
knowledge, as Husserl wishes. But the other's otherness, by the very fact that it is other, can 
never be immediately given. How, then, do we come to be aware of it? This is the problem 
Husserl sets out to solve in the fifth Meditation. 
 
Reduction to Ownness 
   To do so, he begins by restricting awareness to only that which can be said to be known 
immediately, the phenomena that appear within the sphere of my 'peculiar owness,' without any 
presupposition as to their existence in themselves or for others. From this stance we can then ask 
the question, "How can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name 
'experience of something other,' precisely something other..." (CM 94). That is, how do we come 
to see the world as existing in its own right apart from our experience of it, when our only 
immediate knowledge of it is through such experience? How can otherness manifest itself 
through that which is immediate? 
   When we have reduced ourselves to the sphere of ownness, not only does the existence of other 
subjectivities become questionable, but the entire objective world is called into question. How do 
we come to regard anything as existing outside of our experience of it? The question is not 
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whether an independent world exists – this is a fundamental assumption Husserl’s 
phenomenology is not out to challenge – but how we come to be aware that one does. How can 
otherness show up when all 'showing up' is immediate? Only when we discern how we come to 
know the other can we determine whether or not, in the very way in which we know the other, 
there is an ethical implication.  
 
The Body 
   One of the first things I note when I have reduced the world of my experience to the sphere of 
my peculiar ownness, is that, of all objects that appear to me in experience, my own body is 
unique. It is "the sole Object within my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with 
experience, I ascribe fields of sensation...the only Object in which I 'rule and govern’ 
immediately..." (CM 97). The moment I recognize that I am embodied in a spatio-temporal form, 
and that my body, thereby, exists in relation to other objects that are not my body, I am able to 
see myself as physically related to a world of objects 'outside of me' (my body). But this leads to 
a paradox. On the one hand, I am a member of a world full of objects that appear 'outside of me,' 
but on the other hand, this very world, including those things that I take to be ‘outside of me,’ is 
revealed to me within the sphere of my ownness. Thus, there is an 'I' (my ‘human ego’) whom I 
look at as a member of the world of objects that are other than it, and there is the 'I' (my 
‘transcendental ego’) who looks, and thereby intends, both this human 'I' and the world of objects 
to which it is related. The first is seen as a member of a world that transcends it all about, and the 
second has this world, in a sense, within it, as its intended object. 
 
Otherness    
   The transcendental ego, thus, constitutes both my human ego and the world to which it is 
related, but in doing this establishes a division between the two. There is that which pertains 
specifically to my embodied human ego, that which I call I, and there is that to which my human 
ego is related, that which, to the extent that it does not belong to that which I call I, is seen as 
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other. Thus, the transcendental ego divides its experience into two spheres: self and other. But, 
says Husserl, "every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in 
the former sphere." (CM 100) The consciousness of what is other is thus distinguished from the 
actual being of the other itself; the former belongs to the sphere of ownness and the latter to the 
sphere of otherness. Thus, there need be no immediate experience of the otherness of the other in 
order for both spheres to be constituted by the transcendental ego through its immediate 
experience. It is consciousness of the other, which consciousness is itself not other, that leads to 
the sense of the other's otherness. Thus, we never have to leave the sphere of immediate 
experience to understand how, within that sphere, otherness might be constituted. 
 
   But for Husserl, the self/other distinction created by the transcendental ego to account for the 
difference between one's own body and one’s experience of that which lies outside one’s body is 
not the basis upon which the real transcendence of the world can be recognized. The body/other 
division only gives us the distinction between the human ego and its world of 'other' objects. 
Both of these, however, are given within the transcendental ego. In a sense, we have shown how 
the unreflective person might rid herself of solipsism, but we have yet to show how the 
phenomenological philosopher can. If we are to escape 'transcendental solipsism,' then, we must 
be able to recognize that the transcendental ego is itself confronted with an other. This we can 
only recognize in the experience of other subjects who, because their subjectivity is 
fundamentally hidden from us, must fall outside the sphere of the transcendental ego itself. 
Husserl contends that the recognition of the otherness of objects (their otherness to the 
transcendental ego) is ultimately mediated for us by this prior recognition of the otherness of 
other persons, for whom those objects must also exist. It is only because I recognize that worldly 
objects exist for other persons as well as for myself, that I must finally recognize such objects as 
separate existents that transcend my private experience. The question we are led to, then, is how 
do we come to experience the otherness of the other person. 
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Appresentation 
   The problem we must overcome, as we have said, is that the subjectivity of the other person is 
never immediately available to me. "If it were," writes Husserl, "if what belongs to the other's 
own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and 
ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same" (CN 109).  We must, thus, experience the 
other's subjectivity, which can never be directly presented to us, through what Husserl calls an 
'appresentation.' That is to say, along with experiencing the other's body, we must experience as 
'there too,' but hidden from our gaze, the other's subjectivity. 
   Appresentation is something that occurs in our experience of objects as well. We can never see 
all six sides of a three-dimensional object at once. Immediate looking always presents us with 
one side or another; we see the object only in perspectives and profiles – never in its wholeness. 
Yet when we casually look at an object we are not aware of seeing only fragmentary perspectives 
– we do, indeed, experience the object as a whole. The desk, although I see it only in profile, is 
nevertheless experienced as a whole desk and not as a mere collection of profiles. Our ability to 
experience the object as a whole is a result of an appresentation of the hidden sides of the object 
as we look at one of its sides. "[T]he strictly seen front of a physical thing always and necessarily 
appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content" (CM 109). Thus, 
although we see only one side of the object, we 'anticipate' (qua appresentation) its other sides as 
well, and this permits us to synthesize the object as a unitary whole. The result is that our 
experience is not of a world of miscellaneous perspectives, but of self-integrated and interrelated 
objects.  
  Analogously, says Husserl, when we look at another person, the always hidden 'inside' of that 
person, his or her subjectivity, is appresented to us along with the person's outward appearance. 
But the appresentation of the person's subjectivity presents a problem that we don't encounter 
with the object. In the case of the physical object what is appresented is always subject to 
verification through direct perception, and has in fact been verified for us time and again in the 
course of past experience with that object or objects like it. We can anticipate what the hidden 
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sides of the object will look like because we have seen them before, and we can have confidence 
in what is appresented to us because we can always turn the object around and verify whether or 
not it is the way we anticipate. In the case of a physical object, then, the content of the 
appresentation comes from prior experiences with the object itself.  
     But no matter how we orient ourselves to the human 'object' we can never make its 
subjectivity appear. No prior experience has disclosed this subjectivity directly so that we can 
now apperceive it in the present case. From where, then, do we get the idea of the other's 
subjectivity? What is it, precisely, that is appresented to us when we apprehend this subjectivity? 
It cannot be a prior experience of this subjectivity, for that has never been and could never have 
been presented to us. There must be something in the sphere of our ownness that we attribute to 
the other, thereby providing the content for what is appresented: "The perception that functions 
as the underlying basis [of the appresentation]," writes Husserl, "is offered us by our perception 
of the primordially reduced world, with its previously described articulation – a perception going 
on continually within the general bounds of the ego's incessant self-perception" (CM 110).            
   Or, put more simply: What we attribute to the other is something of our experience of 
ourselves.   
   
Pairing 
   This occurs, according to Husserl, through what he calls a 'pairing association': "In a pairing 
association the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given 
intuitionally...in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis...they found 
phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair" (CM 
112). In a pairing association what is directly perceived in the one object can serve as the basis 
for what is apperceived in the other. The two data are associated with one another through their 
similarity, and this allows the one to be constituted through an apperception of what was 
originally perceived in the other. In the case of myself and the other, the two data that are paired 
are our respective bodies. 
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    When I perceive the body of another, and recognize it as similar to mine, a phenomenological 
pairing takes place, in which what is directly perceived as belonging to the body I have the 
greater access to (my own) is apperceived as belonging to the other body as well. Thus, as I am 
aware that my body is that of an animate organism, having a psychic life consisting of a stream of 
subjective experiences, so I apperceive that the other is also an animate organism having a 
similar subjective life. My apperception of the other as a subject is a result of my direct 
awareness of myself as one. In a sense, then, I apperceive myself in the other.  
 
   Of course, I do not imagine that the other is simply another 'me' inhabiting a separate body. I 
am aware that unlike the 'me' that I have direct access to, I have only indirect access to the 'me' of 
the other – and this indirect access confirms the other in his or her 'otherness.' The other is, 
precisely, not me just insofar as I do not have direct access to the other's subjectivity as I do my 
own. Furthermore, the other's body, though similar to mine, is different from mine both in its 
physical appearance, and more importantly, in its behavior. The other does not behave like me at 
every moment, thus I cannot pair every moment of my subjectivity to the other's. Rather, I notice 
that the other behaves as I might were I experiencing such and such a feeling or motivation. I am 
able to apperceive the other's subjectivity at any particular moment just insofar as I have had 
experiences that have led to behavior on my part that is similar to the behavior the other is 
exhibiting. In this way, I know the other through my knowledge of myself. 
 
    A criticism sometimes leveled against Husserl here is that I often see the other, not in terms of 
what my subjectivity would be were I behaving like the other, but in terms of how the other's 
behavior is affecting me – thus I may see the other as angry or loving, not because I associate my 
experience of being angry or loving with the other's behavior, but because the other's behavior 
makes me feel threatened or loved. This would imply a primordial apprehension of the other as, 
precisely, an other that affects me, experienced without the intermediary of any 'pairing 
association.' In this case, I do not attribute, by analogy, my own subjective states to the other, but 
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I have an immediate experience of the other in terms of the subjective states the other produces 
within me. For Sartre, indeed, this is the primary way in which the other is manifest. He 
maintains that we have just such an apprehension of the other when we experience ourselves as 
caught in the other's gaze. 
   It is, of course, possible that both these positions are correct, and represent different modes of 
access to the other. I can have an immediate awareness of the other as affecting me and/or a 
mediate awareness of the other as he or she actually is in his or her own subjectivity, by analogy 
with myself.  Indeed, the phenomenology of each of these ways of experiencing the other may be 
quite distinct, and the final impression I have of the other may result from how I balance these 
two. We will return to this point when we consider the ethical implications of our way of 
apprehending the other.          
    
The Ground of Value 
   We are now in a position to consider some of the ethical questions we began with. Before we 
can tackle the domain of ethical value, however, we must attempt to get clear on the ground of 
value itself. Where does value come from? Is it manifest in the private sphere of my own 
experience and, if so, how? In Ideas 2 Husserl speaks of the perception of immediate and 
mediate value in the experience of a violin: 
 
To begin with, the world is, in its core, a world appearing to the senses and characterized 
as "on hand," a world given in straightforward empirical intuitions and perhaps grasped 
actively. The Ego then finds itself related to this empirical world in new acts, e.g., in acts 
of valuing or in acts of pleasure and displeasure. In these acts, the object is brought to 
consciousness as valuable, pleasant, beautiful, etc., and indeed this happens in various 
ways; e.g., in original givenness. In that case, there is built, upon the substratum of mere 
intuitive representing, an evaluating which, if we presuppose it, plays, in the immediacy 
of its lively motivation, the role of a value-'perception' (in our terms, a value reception) in 
which the value character itself is given in original intuition. When I hear the tone of a 
violin, the pleasantness and beauty are given originarily if the tone moves my feelings 
originally and in a lively manner...and similarly is given the mediate value of the violin as 
producing such a tone. (I2 196)   
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   I quote this passage at length because it allows us to bring up a number of important points. To 
begin with, Husserl seems to regard value as something of an overlay upon originally 
'straightforward' (and presumably value-neutral) empirical intuitions, as if first of all we are 
aware of things as sensory objects and only later do we note their having value. With this I would 
disagree. It is easy to see how Husserl might arrive at this conclusion while engaged in what he 
regards as the scientific pursuit of phenomenological investigation, for the scientific attitude 
itself entails a certain practical disengagement from the phenomena as they appear. But I think 
that Heidegger gets it more right when he says that our original perception of things, when we are 
not being self-consciously scientific, is in terms of their 'readiness-to-hand,' i.e., their utility and 
function – in a word, their 'value.' What makes a desk a desk, for instance? It is not its shape, size 
or color – for all these are variable. It is the use to which we put it. Thus, a table can become a 
desk and a desk a table without any change to the empirical object. We merely need change its 
function. This indicates that the identity of objects, as we experience them, has more to do with 
their value than with their empirical form. First of all, we constitute the objects of the world in 
terms of that in us which values, and only later, through abstraction, might we come to regard 
them as mere empirical objects – what Heidegger calls 'present-at-hand.' We are, originally and 
primordially, valuing beings.  
  But Husserl makes an important distinction when he speaks of the immediate value of the 
violin's tone, which is experienced as pleasant or beautiful, and the mediate value of the violin 
itself, which has value only insofar as it produces such beautiful tones. Let us call the value of the 
violin itself 'secondary value,' and the value of the tone 'primary value.' Things of secondary 
value have value only insofar as they conduce to something of primary value. The tone, we say, 
has primary value. But to be more precise, it is not the tone itself that has primary value, but the 
hearing of the tone, with all the emotional and mental resonances entailed in this hearing. I do not 
merely hear but feel the tone. It produces a multi-faceted sensation of pleasure – emotionally, 
sensually, and mentally. These feelings are not mere perceptions of something 'other,' as is my 
visual perception of the violin. These feelings are qualifications of me myself. They are 
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qualifications of my own subjectivity. I am not, first of all, a valuing being because I assign value 
to things I perceive. Rather, I assign value to things I perceive because I am first of all a valuing 
being. I experience my own subjective states as having value-meaning (i.e., as being meaningful 
in having value). I am an original, ontological, matrix of value. I am that wherein value abides – 
the primary value to which all secondary value refers. My being is the realm and arbiter of value. 
Only because of this can I 'perceive' value in things. 
 
   Let us look at the phenomenon of value more closely. I value the violin for its tone. The tone 
itself is phenomenally indistinguishable from the subjective modifications it produces in me. 
These subjective modifications have intrinsic value, their value lies in themselves and not in 
anything they serve to produce. The intrinsic nature of their value is manifest in the fact that I 
experience them as of a positive or negative sort. If instead of a beautiful tone I hear a high-
pitched screech from the violin I am repulsed. The subjective modifications I undergo are 
negative; they are accompanied by a wish to be rid of them. This 'wish,' of course, need not be 
brought to explicit cognition. The 'wish' is immanent in the negativity or positivity of the 
subjective modifications themselves. Thus, my subjective modifications come in various 
evaluative flavors; some are positive, some negative, and some a complex mixture of the two. 
Again, we do not have to deliberately evaluate subjective modifications to determine their 
primary value, for this is immediately given. (Although we do have to evaluate them to 
determine any possible secondary value they may have – as a temporal being my state at present 
has implications for my future states, such that a present negative may be valuable in helping to 
achieve a future positive. Thus, a subjective state may have both primary and secondary value, 
and these may differ). But, in all cases, my subjective states have an immanent (primary) value-
meaning prior to any evaluative deliberations.  
   As a valuing being, then, I value myself implicitly. All secondary valuing must refer to a 
primary value that is of value in itself. Such primary value can only be a subjective state of some 
sort, for only a subjective state can feel itself, and thereby know itself as of intrinsic value. 
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Human beings, we shall say – with a nod to Heidegger – are caring beings. That is, they are 
intrinsically concerned about their own subjective states. Language gets in the way of clarity 
here. It is not that we are concerned about our subjective states, as if these subjective states were 
something separate and distinct from our caring about them – rather these states are inherently 
'caring' states; they, in a sense, care about themselves. Their caring for themselves is immanent to 
them; which is the same as to say that they have intrinsic value.  
   It might be pointed out, further, that such self-relational caring is not necessarily selfish caring. 
Our caring might be wholly focused upon the welfare of someone else. The mother cares for the 
child, with little thought to herself. But even in caring for the welfare of the child, this welfare 
affects her, her caring. She is happy if things go well for the child and troubled if they do not. 
Her concern might be entirely a concern for the other with no thought to her own 'empirical' self. 
But still, the very concern she has for the other seeks its own satisfaction. It is still a caring that is 
implicitly concerned with itself, as caring. Thus, all caring is self-reflective. It is always a caring 
about itself as well as the objective thing cared about.    
    
The Imperative of Caring 
   In every instance of caring, then, there is an implicit demand. It is a demand for the satisfaction 
of caring. This satisfaction may take the form of a release from physical pain or mental distress, a 
fulfillment of desire, a retention of a pleasurable state, etc. Depending upon the nature of the 
caring itself, satisfaction can come in many forms. But every caring seeks some satisfaction, and 
has, as one of its potentials, the possibility of failing to be satisfied. Caring, thus, is, by its very 
nature, teleological; it is oriented toward a goal, its satisfaction. This demand for satisfaction that 
caring makes is, again, inherent to caring itself. Caring does not strictly 'make' such a demand, it 
is this demand in its very being. Caring, insofar as it is caring, entails an imperative that it be 
satisfied.  
   But I am not simply a hodgepodge of instances of caring. Rather, as an empirical ego, I am a 
synthetic unity in which these instances are organized and prioritized, allowed expression or 
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suppressed, given prominence or held in abeyance. My ego is a strategy for resolving the terms 
of my caring. At the level of the ego I come to regard myself as a unity of value. This unity 
makes a unified demand to all others: it demands that its value be respected as such. This, I 
would say, is the birth of the ethical 'ought.' The self-valuing ego, on the basis of the intrinsic 
value of its caring, makes a demand that it be respected for what it is; i.e., a being of intrinsic 
value. The 'ought' simply expresses the imperative of caring itself. Caring prescribes that others 
'ought' to respect its value. Thus, the being of caring contains within itself its own demand for 
respect. Such respect, we might note, is articulated in the Kantian formula that all 'rational' 
beings be treated as ends. We would say the same, except we would substitute 'caring' for 
'rational.' All caring beings are, by the very fact of their caring, ends in themselves. This is their 
ontology. Thus, to acknowledge this, and behave accordingly, is only to acknowledge what they 
are. In this sense, then, 'ought' is indeed derived from 'is,' but only because the ought already is – 
it is inherent to the being of caring itself.  
 
The Ethical Imperative  
   We can now tie together our discussion of value with Husserl's phenomenological account of 
the constitution of the other in the fifth Meditation. Insofar as my subjective being makes an 
inherent demand to be respected, and insofar as my knowledge of the other's subjectivity is the 
result of a ‘pairing association’ with my own subjectivity, I cannot acknowledge the other as 
other without also acknowledging that the other's being makes the same demand as mine. I must 
acknowledge that the very same demand that I experience directly in myself, in my own 
subjectivity, is to be found in the other as well. I know the validity of my demand because I have 
direct access to the caring that is its source. I, therefore, know the validity of the demand of the 
other, for I know that its source is an analogon to mine. Thus, just as I recognize that I ought to 
be respected as a caring being, so I implicitly recognize that the other ought to be respected also. 
The ethical ought is inherent to the other's being, and I know of it because of the ethical ought 
inherent to my own. To deny the validity of the other's ought would be to deny the validity of my 
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own, for they have the same basis. I cannot, therefore, accept that it is right to violate the other 
without implicitly allowing that it is right that I be violated as well – but I cannot allow such a 
thing, for I would be opposing the demands of my own being if I did so. Thus, I must 
acknowledge the right of the other to respect.1  
 
   This, then, is the ethical imperative. It is, as will be noted, the insight that underlies the Golden 
Rule. One must treat others as one would be treated by others, because others, as other caring 
beings, have the same intrinsic value as oneself. One can learn of the intrinsic value of others 
through reflection upon the intrinsic value of oneself. One has direct access only to one's own 
intrinsic value; and this is because all intrinsic value is subjectivity. A denial of the ethical 
imperative emanating from the other is an implicit denial of the imperative emanating from 
oneself. Thus, the rule of ' retributive justice' is simply the converse of the Golden Rule. The 
Golden Rule says: You should do to others as you would have done to you. Retributive justice 
says: Be prepared to have done to you what you do to others. These rules are mirror images of 
one another. Both reflect the fact that the other and I, as caring beings, stand in the same relation 
to the ethical imperative.       
 
   But now we run into a difficulty. If Husserl is right about the appresentation of my own 
subjectivity in the other, and this has the ethical implications we have claimed, how is it that we 
so often treat others unethically – and do so, often, casually and distractedly, without recognizing 
that we are doing it? If we truly see ourselves in the other would we not always be vividly aware 
of our ethical responsibilities to the other? 
  This pertains to the criticism brought against Husserl's account earlier. As a matter of fact, I do 
not always regard others as they are in themselves, but often only as they are for me. I may 
apprehend the other, not through a pairing association with myself, but in terms of how I react to 
the other's behavior. Thus, Peter may be viewed as repugnant, not because repugnance is 
something pertaining to the being of Peter (which it could not be, for as a caring being, Peter is a 
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being of intrinsic value) but because I feel repulsed, for whatever reason, when Peter enters the 
room. Perhaps Peter reminds me of someone who has hurt me in the past. Perhaps I have learned 
to be prejudiced against people of Peter’s type. Precisely to the extent that my primary 
determination of Peter is as a being I react to as opposed to a being I associate with, I am failing 
to recognize Peter as of primary value in himself, and taking him only as of secondary value for 
me. This is an unethical stance. It fails to acknowledge the 'ought' inherent to Peter's being. These 
two ways of apprehending the other, then, imply two different ethical positions – only one of 
which is true to the ethical imperative as it emanates from the other's caring. The reactionary 
mode of apprehending the other is ultimately narcissistic and exploitative; it sees the other only 
as a phenomenon within the sphere of my ‘peculiar ownness,’ something existing for me, and 
hence fails to see the other as the person he or she is. This is an inherently unethical mode of 
apprehension.    
     But there are also unethical modes that may be rooted in the pairing association itself. For 
instance, to the extent that I have self-contempt, and to the extent that I apperceive the other 
through a paring association with myself, my very self-contempt might translate into contempt 
for the other; I lash out against others who manifest what I (secretly) fear or despise in myself. 
This suggests that an ethical relation to others requires a healthy relation to self.  There is much 
more to be explored here, but we will have to leave these considerations for another occasion.  
 
Conclusion 
  Thus, we have answered the questions we began with. 'Ought' can indeed be derived from 'is' 
because reflection reveals that being is not value-neutral. We do not need to go hunting for the 
derivation of the ethical 'ought' in elaborate metaphysical theories. It is already inherent to our 
own being, and discoverable through phenomenological reflection. The fact that my only entry 
into the other's subjectivity is through seeing it as an analogon to mine, forces me to realize that I 
am ethically responsible to the other as the other is to me. The only alternative to such an 
acknowledgment is solipsism, in which I refuse to recognize the otherness of others and come to 
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see them as existing strictly for me. Solipsism, it is often said, is not a viable position, and no one 
seriously entertains it. But to see the other as of mere secondary value for me is itself a kind of 
solipsism, for it fails to acknowledge the other as an other – i.e., as a being of independent value. 
In the course of ordinary life, then, we are more solipsistic than we suppose.  
   And this realization has implications for human community. The establishment of real 
community entails an acknowledgment of the being-value of others, and thus must be built upon 
an ethical foundation. We cannot truly participate in the intersubjective world of community to 
the extent that we take an unethical stance – not simply because it would lead to conflict but, 
more fundamentally, because such a stance entails a kind of intersubjective blindness. Without 
seeing others as others (deserving of care and respect) there is no real community – we are then 
reduced to ourselves alone. To rise above our own lonely isolation, then, we must be respectful 
of the ‘ought’ inherent to the other’s being.     
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1 It might be objected that, by this logic, I can escape acknowledgement of my ethical responsibility to others simply 
by denying that others have an ethical responsibility to me. This is technically true, but the question is whether such a 
denial is ontologically possible. Can we honestly cease to care how we are treated by others without this involving a 
degradation in our relation to self? I believe the answer is no. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that someone 
were to insist that she, as a matter of fact, makes no ethical demand upon others. What we might say of such a person 
is that she has thereby defined herself outside of what we might call ‘the circle of moral regard’ – that is, she has 
defined herself as a being having no moral status. There are many things outside the circle of moral regard – 
tornadoes, diseases, hurricanes – that are a potential menace to us but to which we have no moral obligation. The 
most prudent response of society to such a person would be to destroy her. She would be a potential menace to us, 
and we would have no ethical obligation toward her (by her own insistence). Of course, the moment she protested 
such mistreatment she would, by that fact, have redefined herself as within the circle of moral regard.  But my 
suspicion is that no one with a healthy sense of self can honestly define himself or herself as outside the circle of 
moral regard; i.e., can honestly cease to care how he or she is treated by others.    
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